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1. Introduction1 
As in most other countries in the world, an increasing proportion of the population in 
Switzerland lives in urban and metropolitan areas. This evidence notwithstanding, many 
actors and observers of Swiss politics, but also political scientists in this country continue to 
emphasise multiple effects supposedly resulting from a cleavage between rural and urban 
areas of the country. True, this traditional cleavage has played a strong role in the 
constitutional history of the country (e.g. in the design of the federalist institutions), as well as 
in the structuring of the national party system, but also with respect to political behaviour 
during much of the 19th century and long into the 20th. With only 26.7% of the population 
living in rural areas in 2000 – with a tendency to further decrease – the rural-urban cleavage 
is, however, bound to become less and less significant to understand politics in Switzerland. 
Against the background of increasing urbanisation and metropolitanization, the interesting 
question is to what extent cleavages within the urban area can be discerned and to what 
extent these cleavages structure political behaviour and governance in this country. 
The aim of this paper, then, is to explore the existence and the relevance of cleavages within 
Swiss metropolitan areas. We do this on the basis of the analyses of structural and political 
change suggested in the IMO research programme for the Stuttgart meeting. The paper 
starts with a first theoretical section that presents the conceptual framework of the analysis, 
as well as results of recent research showing that a profound transformation of the cleavage 
structure has taken place from the early 1990s onwards. The second part of the paper then 
presents the results of the analyses of structural, as well as electoral data at the communal 
level in the seven Swiss metropolitan areas under scrutiny. These include the IMO-typology 
of communes for all seven metropolitan areas, as well as bi-variate and multi-level 
regression analyses of electoral turnout and voter cleavage scores on four major political 
cleavages.  
 
2. The cleavage concept and its relevance for studying metropolitan politics 
2.1 Conceptual clarification 
Our analysis of political change in the metropolitan areas in Switzerland will be revolving 
around the concept of political cleavages. Going back to the seminal work of Lipset and 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on research done in the project Assessing the trend towards new regionalism 
supported by the National Centre of Competence in Research Challenges to Democracy in the 21st 
century (NCCR Democracy) at the University of Zurich. We would like to thank Samuel Witzig for 
his assistance in collecting the data used for the analyses presented in this paper.  
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Rokkan (1967) on the evolution of party systems in Europe, the concept of cleavage is based 
on the idea that societies are characterised by relatively stable lines of conflict that structure 
political behaviour therein. Lipset and Rokkan have argued that cleavages are a result of 
societal conflicts that have occurred during the modernisation process. Deeply entrenched 
within in the societal structure, they orient systems of interests and values over a long period. 
As such, cleavages are therefore able to explain many aspects regarding the nature of 
politics found in a given society – such as the formation and the continued existence of 
certain types of political parties.  
Hence, the concept of cleavage has often been used to explain the structure of party 
systems as well as electoral and political behaviour more generally. However, Bartolini and 
Mair (1990. 212 ff) have shown that, more often than not, the concept of cleavage has 
remained vague and ambiguous, due to a variety of uses oscillating “between the two main 
approaches of political sociology: that of social stratification and its impact on institutions and 
political behaviour, on the one hand, and that of political institutions and their impact on 
social structure and change, on the other” (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 215). They hence 
suggest to clarify the notion of cleavage by establishing a theoretically autonomous definition 
of cleavage “as a concept which links social structure and political order” (Bartolini and Mair 
1990: 215), by incorporating three levels:  
• An empirical element that allows to ‘objectively’ identify the socio-structural basis of 
separating groups with respect to various characteristics such as religion, ethnicity, 
economic position etc. This is the structural ground for individual and organisational 
value systems.  
• A normative element, i.e. a set of shared values and beliefs providing a sense of 
collective identity and roles of social groups within their position in the social 
structure. Any political cleavage involves a range of policy-related conflicts in which 
social groups will defend characteristic ideological positions.  
• An organisational/behavioural element, i.e. a set of “individual interactions, institutions 
and organisations, such as political parties” (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 215), which 
develop as part of the cleavage. Cleavages, to exist, must be mobilised by political 
organisations or institutions that make them appear. 
In other words, Bartolini and Mair’s definition emphasises that a cleavage does not simply 
equal socio-structural divisions within society: class is different from the class-based 
cleavage; the ethnic mosaic is distinct from the ethno-linguistic cleavage. For a cleavage to 
exist, it takes structure, values and organisation simultaneously (Ladner 2004: 315). 
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2.2 The emergence of new cleavages 
In their work on European party systems, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have not only identified 
four major cleavages that have structured the political space throughout Europe – the 
centre/periphery, religious/secular, rural/urban and owner/worker cleavages. They also 
argued that these four classic cleavages continue to be the major structuring element of 
European politics, as is indicated by the relative stability of the party systems in most 
European countries until the late 1960s (‘frozen party system’-hypothesis). Whereas the 
former contention is widely accepted, the latter has been subject to heavy debate. Two 
arguments are important in this debate.  
On the one hand, it has been argued that the structuring capacity of the four classic 
cleavages has been reduced since World War II, due to societal change such as 
“secularisation, value change, rising levels of education, improved standards of living and 
sectoral change (teritiarization)” (Kriesi et al. 2006: 923). Some have argued that this 
resulted in the emergence of new cleavages, such as the “new value” cleavage diagnosed by 
Inglehart (1990). Others have, instead, argued that these developments have transformed 
the classic cleavages rather than making them disappear. An influential contribution in this 
respect was Kitschelt’s (1994) study showing that the class cleavage has been transformed 
by the emergence of a conflict between libertarian and authoritarian values since the late 
1960s, thereby adding a new ‘cultural’ dimension to the traditional left-right opposition mainly 
concerned with ‘socio-economic’ issues. Similarly, current work by Kriesi et al. (2006) 
suggests that the 1990s have seen the emergence of a new conflict between losers and 
winners of globalisation processes, thereby leading to a further differentiation of the cultural 
and socio-economic dimensions of the political spaces, inasmuch as the attitudes towards 
globalisation encompass both socio-economic aspects (e.g. fear of losing one’s job due to 
delocalisation) and cultural ones (e.g. fear of losing one’s identity due to increased 
immigration). 
On the other hand, it has been argued that party voting and party system characteristics are 
bad indicators for the evolution of cleavage structures. Indeed, it can be argued that the 
emergence of new cleavages also leads to an adaptation of existing mainstream parties who 
“take up the new preferences, identities, values and interests, and interpret and articulate 
them in their own specific ways” (Kriesi et al. 2006: 925). Hence, evolving party programmes 
with traditional parties (e.g. the trend towards “new labour” in European social democracy) 
can be at least as indicative for changing cleavage structures – if not more – than the 
foundation of new parties at the margins of the party system (e.g. the Greens in the 1970s). 
But if parties have changed as a consequence of the transformation of cleavage structures, it 
must also be assumed that changes in the meaning of party voting have occurred in parallel: 
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voting for a Social Democratic Party or for a Nationalistic party could mean something totally 
different in the beginning of the 1980s than it does at the end of the 1990s – depending on 
the ways in which these parties have adapted to the transformed cleavages. 
2.3 Political cleavages in Switzerland and their transformation in the 1990s 
The four classic cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan have generally been considered 
relevant for understanding the political space in Switzerland as well. As far as the party 
system is concerned, Linder (2005: 86 ff.) argues that the lines of division between the four 
major parties in Switzerland can be adequately explained by situating them in the Lipset and 
Rokkan cleavage typology (Table 1). Two additional observations need to be emphasised in 
this respect. On the one hand, political parties in Switzerland have always tended to build on 
the mobilising potential resulting from several cleavages (e.g. the FDP tends to mobilise the 
urban secular right). On the other hand, although Switzerland is composed of three different 
linguistic communities (German, French and Italian speaking), who show significantly 
different value orientations and attitudes on various policy issues (Kriesi 1996), this line of 
division is not organised by the party system. All major parties exist in all three linguistic 
regions; there are no linguistic or ethnic parties such as they can be found in Belgium or 
Canada, for example. In Bartolini and Mair’s terms, we cannot therefore speak of a linguistic 
cleavage in Switzerland. 
Table 1: The four major Swiss parties in the Lipset/Rokkan cleavage typology 
 Secularist Religious 
 Urban Rural Centre Periphery 
Left SP   
Right FDP SVP  CVP 
 
Legend: CVP: Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (Christian Democratic Party) 
  FDP: Freisinnigdemokratische Partei (Radical Democratic Party) 
  SP: Sozialdemokratische Partei (Social Democratic Party) 
  SVP: Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party) 
 
Scholars of Swiss political parties (see Ladner 2004; Ladner 2006) consider that the stability 
of the Swiss party system until the late 1960s can be considered as a result of the stability of 
these cleavages – thereby confirming the ‘frozen party systems’-hypothesis. However, the 
emergence of new parties such as the Greens in the 1980s, but also the changing electoral 
basis of the traditional parties has made clear that these four classic cleavages have lost its 
structuring effect in the political space. Similarly to developments in other European 
countries, value change has stimulated the emergence of new lines of political conflict (see 
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Hug and Sciarini 2002), leading to a profound transformation of the political cleavage 
structure in Switzerland. 
According to Kriesi (2005: 3), this transformation starts in the 1970s with waves of opposition 
against the four major established parties. In the process, these lose votes massively to 
newly founded challenger parties mobilising a wide range of positions on the political 
spectrum – including new parties on the far right, but also new Middle-class parties, the 
Greens and new parties on the far left. This anti-establishment opposition reaches its height 
in the national elections of 1991, resulting in a massive success of outsider parties over the 
four major traditional ones. However, Kriesi (2005: 3) argues that this was merely the prelude 
to the major transformation of the party system that took place during the 1990s as a 
consequence of the massive mobilisation by the Swiss Peoples’ Party (SVP). By the turn of 
the millennium, the SVP became the strongest party and managed to more than double its 
share of votes between the elections of 1991 (roughly 11%) and 2003 (26.7%).  
The rise of the Swiss Peoples Party during the 1990s has been considered the single most 
important question for contemporary electoral studies in Switzerland (Lutz and Selb 2006: 
446). The political position advocated by the SVP was mainly a clear opposition to 
Switzerland’s integration into the EU, as well as a strong emphasis on traditional values and 
national identity, including resistance against immigration. Kriesi et al. (2005) have shown 
that the key success factor of the SVP was its ability to monopolise this position of opposing 
the opening of Switzerland towards the outside world in general, and the EU in particular. In 
the process, the other parties have been compelled to situate themselves with respect to the 
SVP. This indicates the existence of a cleavage between integration and demarcation 
(“Öffnung und Abgrenzung”) that is increasingly organised in the party system. The result is 
that the party system in Switzerland today is divided according to two dimensions. To the 
classical socio-economic division between the left and the right, a new cultural division was 
added between those who are in favour of Switzerland as an internationally open and 
culturally liberal country and those who are in favour of traditions and national identity (Kriesi 
et al. 2005: 5).  
As far as the socio-structural basis of this new cleavage is concerned, Kriesi et al. (2006) 
argue that it relies on a differentiation in terms of winners and losers of globalisation: “The 
likely winners include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international 
competition as well as all kinds of cosmopolitan citizens. The expected losers, by contrast, 
include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all 
unqualified employees and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national 
community” (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922).  
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2.4 The relevance of urban areas 
Much has been written about the ways in which social change, as well as the emergence of 
this new cleavage between globalisation losers and globalisation winners transforms the 
existing cleavages in the Swiss political space (Ladner 2004; Kriesi et al. 2005; Kriesi et al. 
2006). However, in terms of the fourfold Lipset and Rokkan typology of cleavages, this work 
has primarily resulted in affirming the strength of the traditional left-right cleavage (to whose 
socio-economic dimension, a new cultural dimension has been added), all the while 
observing the withering away of the religious cleavage or the centre-periphery cleavage in 
terms of their significance for explaining the structuring of the Swiss political space.  
Interestingly however, little is generally said regarding the rural-urban cleavage. This is all 
the more astonishing, as the SVP – the object of primary scientific interest for Swiss electoral 
researchers as we have seen above – originally formed in the rural parts of the country, 
representing the interests of farmers and small rural businesses against those of the city-
based radical liberals. How can the rise of the SVP during the 1990s be explained against 
this background? Ladner contents himself to the observation that the intensity of the rural-
urban cleavage is on the decrease, and that the rise of the SVP in recent years has nothing 
to do with the traditional rural-urban cleavage in terms of an agrarian socio-structural basis 
(Ladner 2004: 384). In contrast to Ladner, Kriesi et al. (2005: 52) show that the distinction 
between rural or urban electorate is a significant predictor for the SVP electoral probability at 
the national level – the rural electorate tends to vote more in favour of the SVP than the 
urban one. However, this result goes largely uncommented, as the authors then go on to 
state that the rise of the SVP at the national level has also taken place in urban regions 
(Kriesi et al. 2005: 54).  
It therefore seems that most recent analysis of the transformation of the political space in 
Switzerland is not really at ease with the question of urban-rural divide. We would argue that 
even if the rural-urban divide empirically comes up as having some significant explanatory 
power in the analysis of political and electoral behaviour, it is much too crude a measure to 
allow significant explanations about the link between territorial development and political 
structures in this country. Indeed, urbanisation is progressing (73.3% of the population lived 
in urban areas in the year 2000 (Kübler and Scheuss 2005)), which raises the question of the 
relevance of the rural-urban divide in general. If the urban area comprises nearly three 
quarters of the population, it might be more urgent seeking to uncover significant divides 
within the urban areas and to understand their link with political cleavages, thereby possibly 
Changing political cleavages in Swiss metropolitan areas  9 
combining an impact on political behaviour that, in turn, contributes to structuring the space 
of politics in this country.2  
The aim of this paper is precisely to do that. Based on the threefold definition of cleavage 
suggested by Bartolini and Mair (1990), we intend to explore the existence and the nature of 
a link between socio-structural divisions within urban areas, the territorial differentiation of 
value systems, as well as their political organisation by parties. The focus of the analysis 
thereby lies on examining the nature of the cleavages identified as the most relevant for 
Swiss politics with respect to a territorially differentiated socio-structural base. More 
precisely, we hypothesise that lines of division within the urban space will increasingly have a 
structuring effect on the nature and the structure of cleavages in Swiss politics. This overall 
perspective points to three clear questions that we need to answer in this paper, namely 
1) What are the socio-structural divisions unfolding in Swiss metropolitan areas? And 
how do they develop over time? 
2) Are there aspects of shared values and/or collective identity unfolding in parallel? And 
how do these develop over time? 
3) Are these socio-structural divisions and shared values/collective identity used by 
political organisations to mobilise? And how does this develop over time? 
In the following, these questions will be investigated based on an analysis of communal level 
data in the seven IMO metropolitan areas under scrutiny in Switzerland. 
 
3. The evolving socio-structural division of metropolitan areas 
Based on the procedure suggested by Jefferey and Vincent in their October 2006 Memo, we 
specified five types of communes in each of the seven metropolitan areas under scrutiny 
(Table 2).3 
The major socio-structural divisions within Swiss metropolitan areas can be shown by the 
analysis of an index of socio-economic hardship across the five types of communes. The 
general pattern can be described as follows: urban concentrations (equal to core cities in the 
cases under scrutiny here) generally show the highest values of the socio-economic hardship 
index (see also Kübler and Scheuss 2005: 220). They are even more distressed than the 
                                                          
2 The current campaign for the national elections in 2007 suggests that parties intentionally seek to 
appeal more to “urban voters”- but it is as yet unclear what they mean by this. The SP clearly has 
the core cities in mind, whereas the SVP seeks to appeal mainly to the conservative suburban 
areas. 
3 See the methodological appendix for a description of and procedures adopted and data used in the 
analysis. 
Changing political cleavages in Swiss metropolitan areas  10 
poor suburbs which come second. No clear distinction can be made between middle class 
suburbs and low density suburbs. Finally, the lowest levels of socio-economic hardship are 
found in affluent communes, as expected.  
Table 2 : IMO-typology of communes in the Swiss metropolitan areas 
 1980   1990   2000  
MA 
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Zurich 132 970,073 27.0 132 1,021,859 31.2 132 1,080,728 30.8 
Urban concentration 1 369,522 43.1 1 365,043 51.8 1 363,273 54.4 
Poor suburbs 40 282,803 32.0 31 313,196 41.0 33 345,067 44.8 
Middle class suburbs 33 141,440 24.1 28 137,623 31.6 28 155,793 30.6 
Affluent suburbs 26 105,173 18.0 23 83,605 23.9 23 89,838 21.2 
Low density suburbs 32 71,135 30.7 49 122,392 27.9 47 126,757 25.4 
Basle 74 461,092 31.7 74 475,408 37.0 74 479,308 34.5 
Urban concentration 1 182,143 47.9 1 178,428 58.5 1 166,558 59.4 
Poor suburbs 18 102,489 35.9 18 123,101 46.7 19 137,600 46.8 
Middle class suburbs 12 68,431 25.2 13 108,487 37.9 12 96,764 33.3 
Affluent suburbs 13 60,492 20.4 18 27,549 28.0 15 31,438 21.2 
Low density suburbs 30 47,537 36.3 24 37,843 35.2 27 46,948 33.0 
Geneva 74 383,413 25.5 74 425,849 36.4 74 471,314 32.4 
Urban concentration 1 156,505 50.9 1 171,042 67.4 1 177,964 61.4 
Poor suburbs 4 59,209 45.0 16 157,250 52.1 12 167,647 54.9 
Middle class suburbs 6 71,793 37.1 8 30,905 37.3 12 43,220 33.7 
Affluent suburbs 36 77,340 22.4 23 37,603 31.2 23 48,735 26.2 
Low density suburbs 27 18,566 23.2 26 29,049 29.8 26 33,748 25.6 
Berne 41 338,817 27.7 41 351,084 32.5 43 349,096 31.6 
Urban concentration 1 145,254 40.4 1 136,338 49.5 1 128,634 46.0 
Poor suburbs 10 45,911 32.1 3 23,734 46.3 6 49,675 43.0 
Middle class suburbs 14 97,610 27.0 19 132,615 34.3 12 103,918 35.6 
Affluent suburbs 8 38,232 19.3 13 50,664 26.4 18 54,816 24.1 
Low density suburbs 8 11,810 30.2 5 7,733 30.1 6 12,053 32.0 
Lausanne 70 272,053 32.0 70 300,280 39.1 70 311,441 35.8 
Urban concentration 1 127,349 46.9 1 128,112 61.0 1 124,914 63.8 
Poor suburbs 21 74,355 37.6 18 90,986 51.1 15 92,545 54.3 
Middle class suburbs 16 19,101 29.2 18 39,133 38.0 19 53,858 36.3 
Affluent suburbs 13 39,050 23.9 22 29,264 30.0 25 27,893 24.5 
Low density suburbs 19 12,198 32.9 11 12,785 37.4 10 12,231 32.7 
Lucerne 17 173,518 32.0 17 187,195 35.9 17 196,550 38.0 
Urban concentration 1 63,278 39.5 1 61,034 46.9 1 59,496 47.5 
Poor suburbs 10 97,301 34.7 7 92,146 43.1 7 100,127 48.2 
Middle class suburbs 2 4,624 25.6 5 22,050 34.2 4 22,976 34.7 
Affluent suburbs 3 8,223 18.6 2 9,678 24.0 3 12,784 23.0 
Low density suburbs 1 92 50.9 2 2,287 21.6 2 1,167 26.3 
Lugano 72 98,395 38.7 72 108,220 44.0 72 120,800 46.9 
Urban concentration 1 27,815 49.9 1 25,334 66.3 1 26,560 68.7 
Poor suburbs 15 18,657 43.9 26 50,456 53.8 27 59,501 59.1 
Middle class suburbs 36 37,525 38.8 27 22,385 42.3 32 26,095 41.3 
Affluent suburbs 20 14,398 33.8 17 8,871 31.3 12 8,644 32.8 
Low density suburbs 0 0 - 1 1,174 32.0 0 0 - 
Overall 480 2,697,361 30.2 480 2,869,895 36.3 482 3,009,237 35.1 
 
In addition to these intra-metropolitan differences, there are also differences between the 
metropolitan areas under scrutiny, though they are not as clear-cut. While the Zurich and the 
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Berne metropolitan areas are displaying low socio-economic hardship the Lugano area is the 
most deprived one. All others rank differently during the observed time period. 
In terms of temporal development, there has been an increase of socio-economic hardship in 
all large metropolitan areas between 1980 and 1990. Yet, the socio-economic deterioration 
was unevenly distributed: some types of communes suffered more worsening than others. 
Core cities and poor suburbs were particularly concerned by this trend, sometimes middle 
class suburbs, too, while some low density and affluent ended up in an even more 
comfortable situation as a decade before. In addition the French and the Italian speaking 
metropolitan areas were more affected by the expansion of social hardship than the German 
speaking ones. 
During the 1990s urban hardship slightly decreased. Often the alleviation was in favour of 
middle class, affluent, and low density suburbs. Only the central cities of Geneva and Berne 
show lower index values in 2000. And save the exception of the Berne metropolitan area 
poor communes had to face further increase of socio-economic hardship. 
In sum the social disparities in the Swiss metropolitan areas deepened from 1980 to 2000. 
However, this did not lead to the formation of social or ethnic ghettos and there was even a 
decrease of the hardship disparity between the core cities and their suburbs during the 
1990s (Kübler and Scheuss 2005). With respect to the figures above the polarisation is not 
so much between the core city and its suburbs but between the core city and the poor 
suburbs on the one hand, and the middle class, affluent, and low density communes on the 
other, giving rise to a more complex pattern of spatial inequalities. 
 
4. The evolving political organisation of cleavages in metropolitan areas 
This section deals with the question of how the socio-structural divisions observed in Swiss 
metropolitan areas link to the mobilisation of political lines of division as expressed by the 
party vote at the communal levels. Before turning to this question, however, let us consider 
whether there is a link between socio-structural divisions and electoral turnout. This analysis 
is based on communal level turnout in national elections, as data for the local electoral 
turnout was not available. 
4.1 National electoral turnout 
Beyond the observation that affluent communes are always those with the highest turnout in 
national elections, there are no consistent patterns in the data detectable (see also Table 14 
in the appendix, showing significant homogenous subsets within and across metropolitan 
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areas). Indeed, there are not only large disparities between the different metropolitan areas, 
but also changing patterns within them, as well as across time. 
Table 3 : Communal level turnout in national elections according to metropolitan areas 
and types of communes 
national election turnout (%) 
MA 
1979 1991 1999 
Zurich 47.6 46.9 45.0 
Urban concentration 44.8 43.9 44.0 
Poor suburbs 41.8 41.5 40.1 
Middle class suburbs 46.1 48.0 46.1 
Affluent suburbs 53.0 53.9 51.2 
Low density suburbs 51.9 46.6 44.7 
Basle 46.6 45.9 42.5 
Urban concentration 38.5 43.4 46.4 
Poor suburbs 43.8 42.7 40.8 
Middle class suburbs 48.2 44.4 43.8 
Affluent suburbs 46.2 52.1 47.0 
Low density suburbs 48.1 44.4 40.6 
Geneva 42.9 44.1 36.4 
Urban concentration 36.2 36.9 35.2 
Poor suburbs 35.4 42.3 34.7 
Middle class suburbs 41.2 45.9 40.6 
Affluent suburbs 45.3 52.4 41.8 
Low density suburbs 41.3 37.6 30.6 
Berne 52.9 50.9 45.5 
Urban concentration 46.4 45.3 43.9 
Poor suburbs 53.9 45.7 38.5 
Middle class suburbs 50.2 48.6 45.3 
Affluent suburbs 57.0 57.3 49.5 
Low density suburbs 52.8 47.5 40.9 
Lausanne 39.0 40.3 33.4 
Urban concentration 35.4 37.6 31.5 
Poor suburbs 36.0 37.1 30.5 
Middle class suburbs 36.3 40.9 35.2 
Affluent suburbs 39.2 40.5 33.7 
Low density suburbs 44.8 44.0 33.5 
Lucerne 54.9 43.5 47.2 
Urban concentration 47.2 45.2 48.3 
Poor suburbs 42.5 42.9 45.0 
Middle class suburbs 61.8 39.3 45.8 
Affluent suburbs 58.6 49.6 53.3 
Low density suburbs 61.1 49.1 48.4 
Lugano 58.6 67.0 50.9 
Urban concentration 54.9 63.8 46.4 
Poor suburbs 59.7 67.3 49.9 
Middle class suburbs 57.1 65.4 51.4 
Affluent suburbs 60.4 69.1 52.0 
Low density suburbs - 66.9 - 
 
Therefore, the multivariate analysis is useful to help understand the determinants of national 
electoral turnout in the metropolitan areas under scrutiny (Table 4). Indeed, the results of this 
analysis suggest that there is a link between the socio-spatial structure of a metropolitan 
area and political participation therein. In all three time periods considered, distance to the 
centre and population size have a negative effect on electoral turnout. 
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Table 4 : Determinants of national election turnout (multilevel regression model) 
Parameter Estimates   
    
 1979 1991 1999 
Fixed Effects    
Constant .018 
(.064) 
-.040 
(.128) 
.009 
(.061) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born -.017 
(.058) 
-.201** 
(.068) 
-.188** 
(.061) 
SES Hardship -.121 
(.070) 
.000 
(.071) 
-.045 
(.094) 
SES Generally .316** 
(.067) 
.343* 
(.067) 
.309** 
(.072) 
Manufacturing occupation  -.069 (.052) 
-.126* 
(.055) 
Simpson index of economic diversity  .089* (.040) 
.130** 
(.037) 
Residents under 18 years .362** 
(.049) 
.194** 
(.044) 
.212** 
(.051) 
Retirees .299** 
(.060) 
.006 
(.056) 
.162** 
(.053) 
Single-family housing -.225** 
(.051) 
-.077 
(.052) 
.012 
(.054) 
Ln(Density) .047 
(.064) 
.067 
(.055) 
.035 
(.056) 
Out-commuting  -.109** (.036) 
-.053 
(.038) 
Distance to the centre -.190** 
(.039) 
-.143** 
(.037) 
-.166** 
(.037) 
New housing -.280** 
(.051) 
-.087 
(.045) 
-.219** 
(.043) 
Stability of residence .108* 
(.048) 
.077 
(.044) 
.016 
(.041) 
Ln(Population) -.344** 
(.062) 
-.243** 
(.060) 
-.224** 
(.059) 
Population growth  -.134** (.042) 
-.079 
(.041) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
    
French language region 
 
-.570** 
(.069) 
-* -.813** 
(.072) 
Italian language region 
  
.708** 
(.135)  
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
  
+**  
Concentration (Herfindahl) 
 
-* -** -* 
Segregation (dissimilarity index) 
  
+**  
Polarisation (Nathan-Adams index) 
    
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .431** 
(.028) 
.297** 
(.019) 
.343** 
(.022) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .021 
(.015) 
.108 
(.061) 
.020 
(.014) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 961.672 796.266 848.557 
N 477 477 474 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=7) simultaneous estimation of the effects of metropolitan area-level variables failed. Therefore only 
models with one variable at the second level had been estimated. For each year the model with the most significant level 2 estimate is reported. 
Added are the direction and the level of significance of significant estimates from other single level 2 variable models. 
Empty cells in upper part of the table indicate missing data whereas in the lower part it stands for non significant effects. 
 
Conversely, high socio-economic status, economic diversity and the proportion of residents 
under 18 (as a proxy for the presence of families) have a positive effect on turnout. In 
general, turnout is lower in French speaking metropolitan areas, and higher in the Italian 
speaking one compared to the metropolitan areas in the other language regions respectively. 
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Besides these overall observations, it is interesting to note that significant predictors for 
electoral turnout changed across time. Whereas in the 1979 election, single housing and 
stability of residence had a negative effect on electoral turnout, this was not the case any 
more in the 1991 and 1999 elections. However, in the latter, strong negative effects can be 
noted from the proportion of foreign-born people, as well as from recent population growth, at 
least in 1991. The proportion of new housing had a negative effect on turnout in 1979 and 
1999, too. The institutional structure of a metropolitan area also seems to play a role: during 
all the time there is a negative effect of concentration. In 1991 there are also positive effects 
of institutional fragmentation and segregation – contrary to what Oliver (2000) has found. 
4.2 Cleavage structures 
In order to account for the organisational manifestation of political cleavages we computed 
cleavage scales on the basis of communal median voters4 for several socio-economic and 
cultural conflicts. These are, firstly, the classical economic left/right conflict where advocates 
of free enterprise and limitation of social services oppose those who support regulated 
capitalism and expansion of social services. Secondly, we use a revised version of the 
materialistic cleavage whereby we principally confront those who are in favour of protected 
national economies to those who cheer on open markets. Doing so, we assess the conflict 
between socio-economic winners and losers of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006). Thirdly, 
median voters for libertarian versus authoritarian values have been determined. Following 
Flanagan (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987: 1310f.) this cultural conflict encompasses two sets 
of diverging values regarding a variety of issues such as multiculturalism, freedom and 
human rights, social order, and traditional morality. For a second cultural conflict scale we 
have sorted out values that are related to globalisation. Hence, based on Kriesi et al.’s 
(2006) definition of political programmes regarding cultural globalisation winners and losers, 
conflicting evaluations of Internationalism, European Community, traditional morality, and 
multiculturalism have been retained. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5. 
                                                          
4   On the calculation of cleavage scales, as well as the median voter, see the methodological 
appendix.  
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Table 5 : Average communal cleavage scores, based on communal median voters 
(national elections 1980, 1990 and 2000) according to MAs and types of communes 
 
economic left/right 
(scores) 
socio-economic 
globalisation 
winner/loser 
(scores) 
libertarian/ 
authoritarian 
(scores) 
cultural 
globalisation 
winner/loser 
(scores) 
MA 
1979 1991 1999 1979 1991 1999 1979 1991 1999 1979 1991 1999 
Zurich -6.7 -10.8 2.0 4.7 5.6 0.4 -38.1 -33.5 -10.7 0.4 -4.9 0.4 
Urban concentration -10.2 -10.3 -3.4 6.7 8.5 6.6 -40.6 -38.2 -18.9 -.09 -6.8 -5.6 
Poor suburbs -7.6 -10.8 1.8 5.3 5.9 0.9 -39.8 -33.7 -11.9 0.2 -4.8 0.4 
Middle class suburbs -7.3 -10.6 2.0 5.0 5.4 0.1 -37.6 -34.0 -10.8 0.5 -5.6 -2.1 
Affluent suburbs -3.7 -10.5 2.4 4.2 5.1 -0.7 -35.2 -33.5 -8.7 0.2 -5.4 -1.5 
Low density suburbs -7.2 -11.1 2.1 4.0 5.6 0.6 -39.0 -32.9 -10.5 0.7 -4.3 3.0 
Basle -8.2 -10.9 0.0 5.7 8.7 5.2 -35.1 -38.9 -5.5 0.2 -6.6 -3.9 
Urban concentration -15.2 -9.8 -7.8 8.4 9.2 6.9 -40.5 -40.3 -17.6 -1.5 -7.1 -5.5 
Poor suburbs -10.0 -10.9 -2.6 6.3 8.9 6.3 -35.0 -38.8 -5.4 0.3 -6.6 -4.3 
Middle class suburbs -9.1 -11.6 0.2 5.7 10.0 6.2 -34.0 -42.3 -6.3 0.1 -6.9 -4.6 
Affluent suburbs -7.0 -10.7 2.5 5.3 8.6 4.6 -32.2 -40.0 -2.9 0.1 -6.7 -3.9 
Low density suburbs -7.0 -10.7 0.7 5.3 7.8 4.4 -36.8 -36.3 -6.2 0.2 -6.3 -3.3 
Geneva -5.7 -5.7 5.0 5.5 2.3 -0.6 -31.9 -34.8 2.3 -0.1 -5.4 -2.7 
Urban concentration -12.4 -9.4 0.5 7.2 9.3 5.7 -32.7 -43.3 -18.2 0.0 -6.8 -3.9 
Poor suburbs -12.8 -8.1 1.4 7.5 6.7 5.6 -35.4 -40.8 -9.0 -1.8 -6.6 -3.9 
Middle class suburbs -7.8 -7.5 5.4 6.7 4.8 -1.4 -30.9 -38.1 5.0 -0.2 -6.0 -2.6 
Affluent suburbs -7.9 -5.0 7.0 5.9 1.9 -2.5 -30.1 -34.6 5.4 0.1 -5.0 -1.7 
Low density suburbs -0.9 -4.2 4.8 4.3 -1.1 -1.6 -33.9 -29.8 4.4 0.1 -4.8 -3.1 
Berne -6.3 -11.2 0.0 1.9 6.3 2.6 -40.4 -33.6 -13.9 0.3 -4.6 -3.6 
Urban concentration -10.7 -10.3 -9.1 7.5 9.6 6.8 -40.6 -39.9 -43.7 -0.2 -6.8 -6.4 
Poor suburbs -7.3 -11.2 -0.9 -1.0 10.4 4.6 -39.1 -42.4 -11.9 0.3 -6.9 -4.7 
Middle class suburbs -6.0 -10.8 -0.9 3.2 6.0 2.6 -41.1 -32.7 -13.8 0.2 -4.5 -3.5 
Affluent suburbs -5.1 -11.3 0.9 2.8 5.1 1.2 -41.0 -32.1 -13.7 0.3 -4.2 -3.0 
Low density suburbs -6.3 -12.4 1.3 1.4 7.0 4.3 -40.2 -34.6 -11.7 0.6 -4.2 -4.4 
Lausanne -5.3 -6.0 3.1 5.2 1.6 0.3 -35.3 -34.3 -3.2 -0.2 -5.9 -4.6 
Urban concentration -13.1 -9.3 -6.2 8.5 5.9 5.5 -40.5 -41.4 -41.2 -2.3 -6.4 -5.0 
Poor suburbs -8.2 -7.8 1.5 6.1 4.4 2.5 -36.1 -36.9 -9.6 -0.6 -6.3 -4.7 
Middle class suburbs -3.1 -5.7 3.7 4.7 1.1 -0.2 -34.6 -33.8 -0.1 -0.1 -5.9 -4.6 
Affluent suburbs -7.4 -5.2 4.5 54 0.3 -1.1 -35.1 -33.7 1.1 -0.1 -5.8 -4.5 
Low density suburbs -2.2 -4.7 1.5 4.3 -0.1 0.7 -34.7 -31.4 -6.2 0.3 -5.0 -4.5 
Lucerne -8.9 -15.5 3.8 6.0 11.4 3.8 -28.4 -44.5 0.4 2.6 -7.1 -2.5 
Urban concentration -10.5 -10.6 2.7 6.2 11.2 6.3 -28.7 -45.0 -11.7 0.2 -7.1 -4.9 
Poor suburbs -9.6 -15.8 3.4 6.0 11.4 4.7 -28.6 -44.5 -2.1 2.4 -7.1 -2.4 
Middle class suburbs -10.5 -16.2 5.7 6.1 11.5 3.6 -28.6 -44.4 -6.9 4.3 -7.1 -2.3 
Affluent suburbs -4.5 -13.5 3.6 5.6 11.0 3.9 -27.1 -44.2 -0.7 2.2 -7.0 -3.8 
Low density suburbs -10.5 -17.4 2.0 6.2 11.6 -0.3 -28.8 -44.4 -2.4 4.4 -7.1 -0.1 
Lugano -3.5 -10.1 3.3 5.5 7.1 5.6 -27.1 -41.0 3.0 1.0 -6.9 -4.4 
Urban concentration 0.9 -4.7 4.7 4.5 1.6 4.9 -25.5 -36.2 3.6 0.3 -6.7 -4.7 
Poor suburbs -8.1 -11.0 3.5 5.7 8.1 6.1 -27.7 -41.7 3.6 1.2 -7.0 -4.2 
Middle class suburbs -5.0 -11.1 3.1 5.6 8.0 5.9 -27.6 -41.6 2.2 0.9 -7.0 -4.6 
Affluent suburbs 2.5 -8.0 3.0 5.3 5.0 3.4 -25.9 -39.5 3.3 1.0 -6.8 -4.4 
Low density suburbs - -4.4 - - 0.0 - - -35.2 - - -6.4 - 
 
 
a) economic left/right cleavage 
In table 6 spatial disparities of political orientation are represented as significant differences 
of group means between communal types within metropolitan areas on the one hand and 
across metropolitan areas on the other. The groups correspond to the so called homogenous 
groups derived from Scheffe’s post hoc test to ANOVA. For purposes of convenience 
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subsets are visualised with crosses (x) in columns. Communal types of the same 
homogenous group are gathered by crosses in the same column whereas communal types 
with different means are separated by crosses in different columns. Though it is possible that 
the same communal type is part of two or more groups, each group differs from another in at 
least one type. The same is true for the representation of significant differences between 
metropolitan areas. Columns with groups of similar communes are ordered according to the 
cleavage scale from left to right in descending order. 
Table 6 : Homogenous subsets of scores of economic left/right conflict 1979-1999 
(based on ANOVA) 
MA 1979 1991 1999 
Zurich X X     X    X X    
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x    x      x    
Middle class suburbs  x    x      x x   
Affluent suburbs   x   x       x   
Low density suburbs  x    x      x x   
Basle X X     X    X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x    x      x    
Middle class suburbs  x    x      x x   
Affluent suburbs  x    x       x   
Low density suburbs  x    x      x x   
Geneva X X      X     X   
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x     x     
Middle class suburbs x     x x     x    
Affluent suburbs x     x x     x    
Low density suburbs x      x    x x    
Berne X X     X    X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x    x      x    
Middle class suburbs  x    x      x    
Affluent suburbs  x    x      x    
Low density suburbs  x    x      x    
Lausanne X X      X    X X   
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x    x      x    
Middle class suburbs  x    x x     x    
Affluent suburbs  x    x x     x    
Low density suburbs  x     x     x    
Lucerne X     X      X X   
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x     x     
Middle class suburbs x     x     x     
Affluent suburbs x     x     x     
Low density suburbs x     x     x     
Lugano  X     X     X X   
Urban concentration  x    x     x     
Poor suburbs x      x     x    
Middle class suburbs x x     x     x    
Affluent suburbs  x     x     x    
Low density suburbs      x          
Homogenous groups according to Scheffe’s post hoc test; significance=0.05 
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With respect to the economic left/right conflict various patterns of intra-metropolitan political 
differentiation are discernable. To begin with, there are MAs with no significant internal 
differentiation at all, such as the Lucerne MA. Other metropolitan areas were politically 
homogenous only for one election of the three election years under scrutiny. These are the 
Geneva area in 1979 and the Zurich, Basle, and Berne areas in 1991. Second, there are 
cases that show political polarisation of left central cities versus right wing suburbs such as 
the metropolitan areas of Lausanne and Berne in 1979 and 1999. There are cases, however, 
with more complex political disparities between types of urban communes. Such are the 
metropolitan area of Zurich in 1979 and 1999, the metropolitan area of Basle in 1999, the 
metropolitan area of Geneva in 1991 and 1999, and the metropolitan area of Lausanne in 
1991. In general, these political differences are correlated to socio-economic disparities: 
distressed central cities and, sometimes, poor suburbs are on the left, affluent suburbs are 
on the right and middle class and low density suburbs adopt a position between them. Last 
but not least, the Lugano metropolitan area is a fairly particular case. In 1979 the central city 
was on the right together with the affluent and middle class suburbs. In 1991 the central city 
made a shift to the left whereas the poor suburbs joined the middle class and affluent 
communes on the right. Leaving aside low density suburbs, which is represented by only one 
commune, these shifts established the central city – suburb polarisation also present in 
1999. 
From 1979 up to 1999 the number of homogenous groups at the metropolitan area level 
grew from two to three indicating an increase of political differences between large Swiss 
metropolitan areas. In general terms, the German speaking metropolitan areas of Zurich, 
Basel, Berne and Lucerne are more on the left. Yet, the Lucerne area changed from a 
marked left position in 1979 and 1991 to a more right wing position in 1999. 
How can we explain these disparities and in what way are they related to socio-structural 
variables? According to the results drawn from multi-level regression the most important 
factors that are linked to the economic left/right orientation of an urban commune in 
Switzerland are the proportion of foreign born people, and the proportion of retired persons. 
Communes with high proportions of foreign-born and retired people are more on the right. In 
1979, however, these variables were only two among a variety of other characteristics that 
had affected economic left/right voting. Communes on the left had been characterised by 
more socio-economic hardship, larger proportions of residents under 18 years, single-family 
housing and higher population density and population size. Except of socio-economic 
hardship all these variables were of no importance in 1991. Instead the proportion of foreign-
born people turned out to be the strongest predictor for economic left/right voting. In addition, 
communes at a large distance to the centre tended to be more on the right. 
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Table 7 : Determinants of economic left/right conflict 1979-1999 (multilevel regression 
model) 
Parameter Estimates   
    
 1979 1991 1999 
Fixed Effects    
Constant -.152 
(.051) 
-.051 
(.136) 
.011 
(.086) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born .188** 
(.067) 
.445** 
(.082) 
.335** 
(.082) 
SES Hardship -.420** 
(.092) 
-.287** 
(.087) 
-.216 
(.125) 
SES Generally -.012 
(.087) 
.106 
(.080) 
.301** 
(.096) 
Manufacturing occupation  -.088 (.064) 
.152* 
(.072) 
Simpson index of economic diversity  -.087 (.049) 
.074 
(.049) 
Residents under 18 years -.160** 
(.062) 
.029 
(.054) 
-.005 
(.068) 
Retirees .255** 
(.071) 
.167* 
(.068) 
.196** 
(.071) 
Single-family housing -.290** 
(.065) 
.044 
(.063) 
-.028 
(.073) 
Ln(Density) -.255** 
(.083) 
-.088 
(.067) 
-.100 
(.075) 
Out-commuting  -.036 (.044) 
.052 
(.051) 
Distance to the centre .036 
(.048) 
.150** 
(.044) 
-.024 
(.050) 
New housing -.012 
(.066) 
.035 
(.054) 
.111 
(.058) 
Stability of residence -.088 
(.062) 
-.013 
(.053) 
.075 
(.055) 
Ln(Population) -.271** 
(.078) 
.101 
(.073) 
-.280** 
(.080) 
Population growth  -.012 (.052) 
-.021 
(.055) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
 
   
French language region -.152** 
(.051) 
.434** 
(.145)  
Italian language region 
 
+**   
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
    
Concentration (Herfindahl) 
 
   
Segregation (dissimilarity index) 
    
Polarisation (Nathan-Adams index)   -.234** (.085) 
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .774** 
(.050) 
.443** 
(.029) 
.615** 
(.040) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .000 
(.000) 
.120 
(.069) 
.039 
(.027) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 1231.288 985.416 1125.551 
N 477 477 474 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=7) simultaneous estimation of the effects of metropolitan area-level variables failed. Therefore only 
models with one variable at the second level had been estimated. For each year the model with the most significant level 2 estimate is reported. 
Added are the direction and the level of significance of significant estimates from other single level 2 variable models. 
Empty cells in upper part of the table indicate missing data whereas in the lower part it stands for non significant effects. 
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In 1999 the picture changed once again. The proportion of foreign-born still had been the 
strongest predictor for economic right voting. Yet, instead of socio-economic hardship, high 
socio-economic status had a significant effect. Accordingly the position of the median voter in 
high socio-economic status communes was more on the right. Finally large communes were 
again on the left. 
Differences between metropolitan areas can be explained by the language regions in 1979 
and 1991. Interestingly, French speaking metropolitan areas were on the left in 1979 and on 
the right in 1991. In 1999 the only significant metropolitan area-level variable was 
polarisation, as measured by the city-suburb disparity index proposed by Nathan and Adams 
(1976). 
In sum the socio-structural predictors of the economic left/right disparities in Swiss 
metropolitan areas has changed from 1979 to 1999 whilst the most important changes 
occurred between 1979 and 1991 when the effects of globalisation started to alter Swiss 
politics (Kriesi et al. 2006, see above). 
b) socio-economic globalisation winners/loser 
Similar patterns of differentiation in metropolitan areas can be seen with respect to the socio-
economic globalisation winners/loser conflict, though their occurrence generally differs from 
those related to the economic left/right conflict. More often we find either cases with no 
differences between types of urban commune types or where we have a complex pattern 
related to the socio-economic disparities in a given metropolitan area. Only in the Zurich area 
in 1979 and 1991 and in the Lausanne area in 1999 as well as in the Lugano area in 1979, 
one finds political polarisation between the central city and its suburbs. 
Save the metropolitan area of Lugano, central cities and poor suburbs tend to support 
political programmes in favour of socio-economic globalisation losers whereas middle class 
suburbs, i.e. market regulation and protectionism, whereas affluent suburbs and low density 
suburbs people agree more on open market policies. Complex or polarised patterns of 
political differentiation mainly occur in the 1991 election in the German speaking metropolitan 
areas of Zurich, Basle, and Berne which is in stark contrast to the absence of political 
differences between commune types in these areas regarding the economic left/right conflict 
the same year (see above). Equally, with the exception of the Zurich and Geneva areas, 
there are no spatial disparities in Swiss metropolitan areas in 1999 with respect to the socio-
economic globalisation conflict.  
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Table 8 : Homogenous subsets of scores of socio-economic globalisation 
winners/loser conflict 1979-1999 (based on ANOVA) 
MA 1979 1991 1999 
Zurich  X     X    X X    
Urban concentration  x     x      x   
Poor suburbs x     x      x    
Middle class suburbs x     x     x x    
Affluent suburbs x     x     x     
Low density suburbs x     x      x    
Basle  X      X      X  
Urban concentration   x    x    x     
Poor suburbs  x    x x    x     
Middle class suburbs x x     x    x     
Affluent suburbs x     x x    x     
Low density suburbs x     x     x     
Geneva  X    X     X     
Urban concentration  x      x    x    
Poor suburbs  x     x     x    
Middle class suburbs x x     x    x     
Affluent suburbs x x    x x    x     
Low density suburbs x     x     x     
Berne X      X X    X X   
Urban concentration x      x    x     
Poor suburbs x      x    x     
Middle class suburbs x     x     x     
Affluent suburbs x     x     x     
Low density suburbs x     x     x     
Lausanne  X    X     X X    
Urban concentration   x    x     x    
Poor suburbs  x     x    x     
Middle class suburbs x x    x x    x     
Affluent suburbs x x    x     x     
Low density suburbs x     x     x     
Lucerne  X       X    X X  
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x     x     
Middle class suburbs x     x     x     
Affluent suburbs x     x     x     
Low density suburbs x     x     x     
Lugano  X     X X      X  
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x     x    x     
Middle class suburbs  x     x    x     
Affluent suburbs  x     x    x     
Low density suburbs      x          
Homogenous groups according to Scheffe’s post hoc test; significance=0.05 
 
Interestingly, while the disparities within metropolitan areas were on the decrease those 
between the urban regions increased. Based on the ANOVA post hoc procedure one can 
discern four homogenous groups in 1999 compared to two in 1979 and three in 1991. 
Moreover there is no clear relationship between the degree to which a metropolitan area is 
integrated in the world market and the position of its median voter on the socio-economic 
globalisation conflict scale. In 1999 voters in the metropolitan areas of Zurich with its 
international finance services tended to support open market policies whereas the Basle area 
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with its important pharmaceutical industry is definitely more in favour of regulated capitalism 
and protectionism. 
Table 9 : Determinants of socio-economic globalisation winners/loser conflict 1979-
1999 (multilevel regression model) 
Parameter Estimates   
    
 1979 1991 1999 
Fixed Effects    
Constant .014 
(.072) 
.047 
(.156) 
.025 
(.143) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born -.082 
(.060) 
-.519** 
(.092) 
-.425** 
(.073) 
SES Hardship .231** 
(.079) 
.287** 
(.098) 
.318** 
(.106) 
SES Generally -.043 
(.070) 
-.088 
(.093) 
-.261** 
(.082) 
Manufacturing occupation  .190* (.080) 
-.052 
(.065) 
Simpson index of economic diversity  .080 (.056) 
-.050 
(.041) 
Residents under 18 years -.023 
(.059) 
-.087 
(.063) 
.036 
(.058) 
Retirees -.027 
(.072) 
-.208** 
(.079) 
-.157** 
(.060) 
Single-family housing .199** 
(.056) 
-.110 
(.070) 
-.060 
(.062) 
Ln(Density) .259** 
(.070) 
.082 
(.075) 
.104 
(.063) 
Out-commuting  .051 (.051) 
-.004 
(.043) 
Distance to the centre .021 
(.055) 
-.245** 
(.053) 
-.175** 
(.043) 
New housing .075 
(.057) 
-.055 
(.060) 
.060 
(.049) 
Stability of residence -.054 
(.049) 
.073 
(.062) 
.046 
(.048) 
Ln(Population) .168* 
(.065) 
.006 
(.084) 
.184** 
(.070) 
Population growth  .061 (.055) 
.045 
(.048) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
    
French language region 
    
Italian language region 
   
+* 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
   
+* 
Concentration (Herfindahl) 
   
-* 
Segregation (dissimilarity index)  .339* (.169) 
.379** 
(.138) 
Polarisation (Nathan-Adams index) -.142* 
(.070)   
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .268** 
(.023) 
.447** 
(.033) 
.435** 
(.028) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .021 
(.015) 
.156 
(.089) 
.131 
(.075) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 433.634 796.826 971.177 
N 279 382 474 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=7) simultaneous estimation of the effects of metropolitan area-level variables failed. Therefore only 
models with one variable at the second level had been estimated. For each year the model with the most significant level 2 estimate is reported. 
Added are the direction and the level of significance of significant estimates from other single level 2 variable models. 
Empty cells in upper part of the table indicate missing data whereas in the lower part it stands for non significant effects. 
 
Regarding results from multilevel regression, throughout the observed time period the 
median voters’ position in communes with important socio-economic hardship is that of 
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supporting political programmes favouring socio-economic globalisation losers. In 1979 
single-family housing, population density and population size also had a positive effect on 
the support of such policies. As with the economic left/right scale, the composition of the 
significant effects, however, changed between 1979 and 1991. From then on there is a highly 
significant outcome of the proportion of foreign-born people: voters in communes where this 
proportion had been high more often support free market policies and anti-protectionism. The 
same is true for communes with large proportions of retired people and communes far away 
from the centre. Furthermore it is noteworthy that manufacturing occupation had but a weak 
effect in 1991 on the median voters’ position. At that time communes with high proportions of 
people working in manufacturing services were in favour of market regulation.  
Political differences between metropolitan areas were mainly due to intra-metropolitan 
polarisation and segregation. The more a metropolitan area had been polarised the more it 
was in favour of free market policies in 1979. In 1991 and 1999 more segregated 
metropolitan areas displayed large support for market regulation. In 1999, institutional 
fragmentation and belonging to the Italian language region favoured market regulating 
political programmes, too, whereas institutional concentration led to support of free market 
policies. 
c) libertarian/authoritarian value cleavage 
Regarding the cultural conflict between libertarian and authoritarian values the median voter 
of central cities is generally more libertarian than median voters of other types of communes. 
This is especially true for the 1999 elections when in all metropolitan areas except of that of 
Lugano the central city’s score on the conflict scale is significantly different from those of the 
other commune types. In the MAs of Basle, Berne Lausanne and Lucerne we find a polarised 
pattern with all suburban types tending towards more authoritarian values than the central 
city. The metropolitan areas of Zurich and Geneva, however, reveal a more complex picture. 
In the Zurich area authoritarian values find the most support in affluent and low density 
suburbs whereas poor and middle class suburbs and some low density suburbs are 
somewhat more in favour of libertarian values. In the Geneva area the poor suburbs are less 
authoritarian than the other suburbs but not as libertarian as the central city. 
In 1991 such complex patterns of political disparities are even more frequent. Save the 
metropolitan area of Lucerne where there are no spatial differences between urban 
commune types one can discern at least two homogenous groups. In the Basle, Geneva, 
Berne and Lausanne areas these differences reproduce more or less the socio-economic 
discontinuities while the Zurich area is depicting a polarised pattern. In the Lugano area the 
only low density commune is closer to the libertarian pole than the other suburbs. 
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Table 10 : Homogenous subsets of scores of libertarian/authoritarian conflict 1979-
1999 (based on ANOVA) 
MA 1979 1991 1999 
Zurich X X      X   X X    
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x      x     x    
Middle class suburbs x x     x     x    
Affluent suburbs  x     x      x   
Low density suburbs x      x     x x   
Basle  X X    X     X X   
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x    x x     x    
Middle class suburbs  x    x      x    
Affluent suburbs  x    x x     x    
Low density suburbs  x     x     x    
Geneva   X X    X      X X 
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x      x     x    
Middle class suburbs x      x      x   
Affluent suburbs x      x x     x   
Low density suburbs x       x     x   
Berne X       X   X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x      x    
Middle class suburbs x      x     x    
Affluent suburbs x      x     x    
Low density suburbs x      x     x    
Lausanne  X X     X     X X  
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x     x     x    
Middle class suburbs  x     x x    x    
Affluent suburbs  x      x    x    
Low density suburbs  x      x    x    
Lucerne    X X X       X X X 
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x      x    
Middle class suburbs x     x      x    
Affluent suburbs x     x      x    
Low density suburbs x     x      x    
Lugano     X X X        X 
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x      x    x     
Middle class suburbs x      x    x     
Affluent suburbs x      x    x     
Low density suburbs      x          
Homogenous groups according to Scheffe’s post hoc test; significance=0.05 
 
Finally there are but rare cases of spatial differences of value orientation for the 1979 
elections. These can be found in the Zurich, Basle and Lausanne areas. Whereas in the 
latter cases the libertarian central city is opposed to a homogenous group of more 
authoritarian suburbs, the Zurich area is characterised by a libertarian group consisting of the 
central city as well as poor, middle class and low density suburban communes on the one 
the one hand and an authoritarian group encompassing some middle class suburbs and the 
affluent communes on the other. 
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What strikes most are the important differences between the seven metropolitan areas under 
scrutiny. For the 1979 and 1999 elections no less than five groups resulted from the ANOVA 
post hoc test. Furthermore, the overall pattern of inter-metropolitan political differences is not 
consistent during the observed time period. In 1979 the Zurich area is the most libertarian 
one whilst the metropolitan areas of Lucerne and Lugano are among the most authoritarian 
ones. This picture is reversed in 1991. 
As with the socio-economic conflicts the proportion of retired people is a stable predictor of 
the median voters’ position on the libertarian/authoritarian conflict scale. The more retirees a 
commune comprises the more it tends to supporting authoritarian political programmes. In 
addition libertarian values find more electoral support in large communes.  
Also as with the socio-economic conflicts discussed above the proportion of foreign-born 
people strongly affects value orientation in 1991 and 1999 in that support for authoritarian 
policies is higher in urban communes with important amounts of foreign-born people. In the 
same years new housing is positively related to authoritarian values, too. In 1979 and again 
in 1999 authoritarian voting is notable in high socio-economic status communes whereas in 
1999 communes with high socio-economic hardship tend to vote in favour of libertarian 
parties. Authoritarian voting is also important in densely populated communes in 1979. 
Interestingly, some variables have different effects on the vote depending on the year of the 
election. In 1979 support for libertarian policies had been high in communes distant from 
centre. In 1991 these communes displayed a more authoritarian political orientation. Only 
weakly correlated are the inconsistent effects of economic diversity in 1991 and 1999. 
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Table 11 : Determinants of libertarian/authoritarian conflict 1979-1999 (multilevel 
regression model) 
Parameter Estimates   
    
 1979 1991 1999 
Fixed Effects    
Constant -.001 
(.182) 
-.107 
(.190) 
-.011 
(.126) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born .028 
(.079) 
.389** 
(.096) 
.276** 
(.076) 
SES Hardship -.071 
(.097) 
-.078 
(.102) 
-.320** 
(.113) 
SES Generally .174* 
(.088) 
.160 
(.097) 
.215* 
(.087) 
Manufacturing occupation  -.080 (.084) 
.125 
(.068) 
Simpson index of economic diversity  -.141* (.059) 
.092* 
(.044) 
Residents under 18 years .122 
(.075) 
.042 
(.065) 
.050 
(.061) 
Retirees .270** 
(.093) 
.168* 
(.083) 
.290** 
(.064) 
Single-family housing .054 
(.069) 
.065 
(.073) 
-.106 
(.065) 
Ln(Density) .212* 
(.085) 
-.035 
(.078) 
-.050 
(.067) 
Out-commuting  -.096 (.053) 
.086 
(.046) 
Distance to the centre -.217** 
(.070) 
.251** 
(.056) 
.045 
(.046) 
New housing -.013 
(.071) 
.147* 
(.062) 
.153** 
(.052) 
Stability of residence -.022 
(.060) 
-.003 
(.064) 
.102* 
(.050) 
Ln(Population) -.195* 
(.083) 
-.202* 
(.088) 
-.286** 
(.073) 
Population growth  -.001 (.058) 
-.090 
(.050) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
   
-.407** 
(.145) 
French language region 
    
Italian language region 
    
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
   
 
Concentration (Herfindahl) -.357 
(.186)   
Segregation (dissimilarity index)  -.421* (.205)  
Polarisation (Nathan-Adams index) 
 
   
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .395** 
(.034) 
.485** 
(.035) 
.492** 
(.032) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .194 
(.111) 
.239 
(.134) 
.088 
(.053) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 552.719 829.695 1025.928 
N 279 382 474 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=7) simultaneous estimation of the effects of metropolitan area-level variables failed. Therefore only 
models with one variable at the second level had been estimated. For each year the model with the most significant level 2 estimate is reported. 
Added are the direction and the level of significance of significant estimates from other single level 2 variable models. 
Empty cells in upper part of the table indicate missing data whereas in the lower part it stands for non significant effects. 
 
As regards the 1979 election the large differences between metropolitan areas cannot be 
explained by any of the metropolitan area-level variables. In 1999 the differences are mainly 
due to the size of the metropolitan area: large metropolitan areas are more in favour of 
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libertarian political programmes than small ones. Finally, in 1991, the libertarian vote is 
comparably high in segregated metropolitan areas. 
d) cultural globalisation winners/losers 
There are in general few differences among urban commune types regarding the conflict 
between cultural globalisation winners and losers. For the 1979 elections we find no 
differences at all in the metropolitan areas of Geneva, Lausanne, and Lucerne. The Zurich, 
Basle, Berne, and Lugano areas display a polarised pattern with central cities strongly 
supporting parties that are in favour of cultural openness opposed to suburbs that are more 
in favour of traditional values and reluctant to multiculturalism. 
For the 1991 elections the ANOVA pos hoc test reveals a complex pattern in the Zurich and 
the Basle metropolitan areas but no major differences in the other MAs. In the Zurich as well 
as in the Basle area the central city is still the commune with the largest support for cultural 
globalisation winner programmes whereas in poor suburbs, affluent suburbs and low density 
suburbs the vote is generally more in favour of those who defend the ‘national way of life’. 
In 1999 in all but the metropolitan areas of Lausanne and Lugano there are political 
variations between types of urban communes. In the metropolitan areas of Basle and Berne 
the central city turns out to be the place where citizens are more in favour of policies in 
accordance with multiculturalism and internationalism than in suburbia. In the Zurich, Geneva 
and Lucerne areas the picture goes, again, beyond that central city/suburb polarisation. In 
the metropolitan area of Zurich poor and low density communes are the least supportive of 
cultural globalisation winners’ programmes. Such programmes, however, are more welcome 
in affluent and middle class as well as in some poor communes. Clearly against isolationism 
is the city of Zurich. In the metropolitan areas of Geneva and Lucerne the differences in 
value voting regarding globalisation arise between central cities, poor and middle class 
suburbs on the one hand and affluent as well as low density suburbs on the other. Yet again, 
the former are more in favour of international integration and more open to other cultures 
than the latter.
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Table 12 : Homogenous subsets of scores of cultural globalisation winner/loser 
conflict 1979-1999 (based on ANOVA) 
MA 1979 1991 1999 
Zurich X X      X X   X    
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x     x x    x x   
Middle class suburbs  x     x     x    
Affluent suburbs  x     x x    x    
Low density suburbs  x      x     x   
Basle X X    X X    X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x     x x    x    
Middle class suburbs  x     x     x    
Affluent suburbs  x     x x    x    
Low density suburbs  x      x    x    
Geneva X       X X  X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x     x     
Middle class suburbs x     x     x x    
Affluent suburbs x     x      x    
Low density suburbs x     x     x x    
Berne X X       X  X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x    x      x    
Middle class suburbs  x    x      x    
Affluent suburbs  x    x      x    
Low density suburbs  x    x      x    
Lausanne X      X X   X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x     x     
Middle class suburbs x     x     x     
Affluent suburbs x     x     x     
Low density suburbs x      x    x     
Lucerne   X   X     X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x     x x    
Middle class suburbs x     x     x x    
Affluent suburbs x     x     x     
Low density suburbs x     x      x    
Lugano  X    X X    X     
Urban concentration x      x    x     
Poor suburbs  x     x    x     
Middle class suburbs  x     x    x     
Affluent suburbs  x     x    x     
Low density suburbs      x          
Homogenous groups according to Scheffe’s post hoc test; significance=0.05 
From 1979 to 1999 the political differences between the metropolitan areas have decreased 
which contrasts with the important inter-metropolitan disparities as regards the 
libertarian/authoritarian value conflict. In addition the relative positions of the metropolitan 
areas were changing during that time. For instance, the Lucerne area was the most in favour 
of cultural globalisation winner programmes compared to the other metropolitan areas. In 
1991 and 1999 the support for such programmes was the least in that place. Note that the 
differences among metropolitan areas in Switzerland were most important in 1991. 
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Table 13 : Determinants of cultural globalisation winner/loser conflict 1979-1999 
(multilevel regression model) 
Parameter Estimates   
    
 1979 1991 1999 
Fixed Effects    
Constant .097 
(.134) 
-.058 
(.178) 
.015 
(.077) 
Commune-Level Variables    
Foreign-born -.162 
(.092) 
.315** 
(.109) 
.283** 
(.080) 
SES Hardship .064 
(.117) 
.145 
(.115) 
-.115 
(.125) 
SES Generally .240* 
(.105) 
.168 
(.110) 
-.306** 
(.095) 
Manufacturing occupation  -.037 (.094) 
.017 
(.070) 
Simpson index of economic diversity  -.222** (.067) 
-.045 
(.049) 
Residents under 18 years .180* 
(.088) 
.128 
(.074) 
.100 
(.066) 
Retirees -.134 
(.110) 
.131 
(.094) 
.075 
(.070) 
Single-family housing -.053 
(.083) 
.078 
(.082) 
.049 
(.071) 
Ln(Density) -.030 
(.103) 
-.086 
(.089) 
-.148* 
(.074) 
Out-commuting  -.052 (.060) 
-.010 
(.050) 
Distance to the centre -.055 
(.083) 
.122 
(.063) 
-.018 
(.050) 
New housing -.207* 
(.085) 
.122 
(.070) 
.110 
(.057) 
Stability of residence .190* 
(.072) 
.053 
(.073) 
-.035 
(.055) 
Ln(Population) -.167 
(.099) 
-.218* 
(.099) 
-.104 
(.080) 
Population growth  .025 (.065) 
-.029 
(.055) 
    
Metropolitan Area-Level Variables    
Metropolitan population 
   
.578** 
(.094) 
French language region 
    
Italian language region 
    
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) 
   
 
Concentration (Herfindahl) -.301* 
(.138)   
Segregation (dissimilarity index)  -.367 (.194)  
Polarisation (Nathan-Adams index) 
 
   
    
Variance Components    
Commune-Level .584** 
(.050) 
.623** 
(.046) 
.607** 
(.040) 
Metropolitan Area-Level .084 
(.055) 
.204 
(.117) 
.027 
(.020) 
    
-2 Log Likelihood 654.194 923.060 1117.841 
N 279 382 482 
Note: Table entries are standardised maximum likelihood (IGLS) estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
*=p<.05, **=p<.01 
As the number of level 2 units is very low (N=7) simultaneous estimation of the effects of metropolitan area-level variables failed. Therefore only 
models with one variable at the second level had been estimated. For each year the model with the most significant level 2 estimate is reported. 
Added are the direction and the level of significance of significant estimates from other single level 2 variable models. 
Empty cells in upper part of the table indicate missing data whereas in the lower part it stands for non significant effects. 
 
Multilevel regression reveals no stable relations between the position of a communes’ 
median voter on the cultural globalisation winner/loser scale and indicators of socio-structural 
composition. In 1979 people in communes with high socio-economic status, high proportions 
of residents under 18 years and a high stability of residence were more in favour of policies 
that value national way of life, traditional morality, and which is critical vis-à-vis international 
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integration. Equally, new housing has a weak negative effect on the support of such 
programmes. However, the level of significance of these correlations is very low. 
In the 1991 elections, the proportion of foreign-born people becomes an important predictor 
for the dependent variable. Where there are high proportions of foreign-born people the 
median voter is closer to parties with cultural globalisation loser programmes. Economic 
diversity and population size show effects in the reverse direction in 1991. Accordingly, large 
and economically diverse communes are more with parties adopting cultural globalisation 
winner programmes. In 1999 high socio-economic status has again a significant effect but 
this time in the other direction: communes with high socio-economic status tend to supporting 
multiculturalism and internationalism. The same counts for population density. 
Variances between metropolitan areas can be explained by concentration in 1979 and by 
metropolitan population size in 1999. Concentrated metropolitan areas are more with cultural 
globalisation winner programmes at the end of the 1970s. At the end of the 1990s 
isolationism and defence of traditional and national values find support in large metropolitan 
areas. Finally, no metropolitan level-area variable displays significant effects regarding the 
1991 elections. 
 
5. Conclusion: the emerging urban-suburban divide 
The analyses presented in this paper suggest two main conclusions. 
On the one hand, the results suggest the existence of politically relevant territorial cleavages 
within the metropolitan areas under scrutiny. Indeed, the presence of two definitional 
elements of such cleavages could be shown, namely a) a territorial differentiation of the 
socio-structural basis and b) the organisation of these cleavages by political parties, in terms 
of a differentiation of political positions for which socio-structural characteristics at the 
communal level are significant predictors. The spatial pattern of this cleavage is mainly one 
that differentiates central cities from the surrounding suburbs. Compared to their 
counterparts in the suburbs, voters in core cities are oriented more to the left, have affinities 
with policies directed at globalisation losers, are more libertarian and denote a higher cultural 
openness to the world. An additional, threefold, cleavage could be found in the larger 
metropolitan areas, denoting differences between core cities, middle-class and poor 
communes, as well as affluent and low density commune. More precisely, these three types 
of communes can be situated at three different points in the two-dimensional political space 
identified by Kriesi et al. (2005: 5, see above). Whereas the core cities tend towards a 
position characterised by left vote and cultural openness, affinities of poor and middle class 
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communes tend to be with the political right and cultural demarcation (i.e. nationalism), 
whereas affluent and low density communes tend to combine right vote with cultural 
openness. 
On the other hand, the results also suggest that the cleavages within metropolitan areas 
have transformed over the last 30 years. Whereas the socio-economic status continues to be 
a significant predictor throughout, the presence of immigrants has become a significant 
predictor towards the end of the 1990s. This echoes findings by other authors who have 
argued that a cultural dimension between openness and demarcation has been added to the 
socio-economic dimension of political cleavages in Switzerland. Our analysis shows that this 
new cleavage dimension also finds a differential territorial expression in metropolitan areas.  
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Methodological appendix 
1. Communal Typology 
The following procedure has been adopted: 
1. Separate out the central city in each metropolitan area. 
2. Use a factor based on density, new housing, and distance to the centre to separate out 
low density suburbs. Use the third (1990 and 2000) or the first (1980) 25th percentile as 
separator. 
3. Use a factor based on low education, retirees, unemployment, foreigners, low socio-
economic status, non-western European languages, university education, highest status 
occupational group, and homeownership to separate out poor suburbs, middle class 
suburbs, and affluent suburbs. Use the 33rd percentiles as separators. 
 
2. Cleavage scales 
The scores of the cleavage scales have been calculated using the Manifesto Research 
Group data by subtracting the sum of appropriate emphases to designate the positive pole of 
the scale from the sum of appropriate emphases indicating the negative pole. The procedure 
corresponds to that adopted by the Manifesto Research Group to construct their left/right 
scale (see Budge and Klingemann 2001: 21f., for a detailed description of the data see 
Appendix III in Budge et al. (eds) 2001). The scores had been obtained as follows: 
a) Economic left/right scale 
per401 Free enterprise per403 Regulate capitalism 
per402 Economic incentives per406 Protectionism: positive 
per414 Economic orthodoxy per412 Controlled economy 
per505 Social services: limitation per504 Social services: expansion 
  
minus 
per506 Education: expansion 
 
d) cultural globalisation winner loser scale 
per109 Internationalism: negative per107 Internationalism: positive 
per110 European Community: negative per108 European Community: positive 
per601 National way of life: positive per604 Traditional Morality: negative 
per603 Traditional morality: positive per607 Multiculturalism: positive 
per608 Multiculturalism: negative 
minus 
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b) libertarian/authoritarian scale 
per104 Military: positive per105 Military: negative 
per109 Internationalism: negative per106 Peace 
per110 European Community: negative per107 Internationalism: positive 
per303 Governmental and administrative efficiency per201 Freedom and human rights 
per305 political authority per202 Democracy 
per601 National way of life: positive per301 Decentralisation 
per603 Traditional morality: positive per411 Technology and infrastructure 
per605 Law and order per501 Environmental protection 
per606 Social harmony per502 Culture 
per608 Multiculturalism: negative per503 Social Justice 
  per506 Education: expansion 
  per604 Traditional Morality: negative 
  per607 Multiculturalism: positive 
  per705 Underprivileged minority groups 
  
minus 
per706 Non-economic demographic groups 
 
c) socio-economic globalisation winner/loser scale 
per403 Regulate capitalism per401 Free enterprise 
per406 Protectionism: positive per407 Protectionism: negative 
per504 Social services: expansion 
minus 
per414 Economic orthodoxy 
 
 
3. Median voter 
For each commune the position of the median voter on the cleavage scale had been 
calculated using the formula (see Kim and Fording 2001:163): 
M = L + ((50-C)/F) x W 
Where: 
M: median voter position (cleavage scale) 
L: the lower end (cleavage scale) of the interval containing the median 
C: the cumulative frequency (vote share) up to but not including the interval containing the 
median 
F: the frequency (vote share) in the interval containing the median 
W: the width of the interval containing the median 
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4. Description of variables 
Variable name definition missing values 
  dependent variables   
National election turnout - 1979: 5/482
1991: 2/482
1999: 0/482 
Position of the median voter on the economic 
left/right conflict scale 
(see above) 1979: 5/482
1991: 2/482
1999: 0/482 
Position of the median voter on the socio-
economic globalisation conflict scale 
(see above) 1979: 5/482
1991: 2/482
1999: 0/482 
Position of the median voter on the libertarian/ 
authoritarian conflict scale 
(see above) 1979: 5/482
1991: 2/482
1999: 0/482 
Position of the median voter on the cultural 
globalisation conflict scale 
(see above) 1979: 5/482
1991: 2/482
1999: 0/482 
  independent variables commune-level   
Foreign born proportion of foreign born people when place of birth is 
known 
1980: 0/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
SES Hardship summary index: (100*(xi-xmin)/(xmax-xmin))/5 
where: 
x1: proportion of people with low socio-economic status 
x2: proportion of unemployed people 
x3: proportion of people with low education profile 
x4 proportion of people in residences where number of 
rooms is smaller than number of occupants 
x5: proportion of retired people 
1980: 2/482
1990: 2/482
2000: 0/482 
SES Generally summary index: (100*(xi-xmin)/(xmax-xmin))/3 
where: 
x1: proportion of people with university degree 
x2: median income 
x3: proportion of heads of household with higher education 
(higher professional education, applied sciences university, 
university) 
1980: 2/482
1990: 2/482
2000: 0/482 
Manufacturing occupation proportion of occupied people working in the 2nd sector 1980: 482/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
Simpson index of economic diversity percentage of maximum value of the Simpson index 
(Simpson index=1-Σpi2, where p stands for the proportion of 
occupied people in three socio-professional categories; 
maximum value: 
Simpson index when all p= 1/number of categories) 
1980: 482/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
Residents under 18 years proportion of people under 18 years of age 1980: 0/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
Retirees proportion of retired people 1980: 2/482
1990: 2/482
2000: 0/482 
Single-family housing proportion of residences that are single-family houses 1980: 0/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
Ln(Density) natural logarithm of population/commune’s surface 1980: 2/482
1990: 2/482
2000: 0/482 
Out-commuting proportion of occupied people working in another commune 
than commune of residence 
1980: 482/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
Distance to the centre geographic distance from a commune’s centre to the centre 
of metropolitan area’s core city in metres: sqrt(x1-x2)2*(y1-
y2)2), 
where x and y indicate coordinates of geographic centres 
5/482 
New housing proportion of dwelling houses built during the last 20 years 
(without renovations) 
1980: 0/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
Stability of residence proportion of population living in the same commune during 
the last five years 
1980: 0/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
Ln(Population) natural logarithm of population size 1980: 2/482
1990: 2/482
2000: 0/482 
Population growth population growth rate: (x10-x0)/x0, 
where: 
x0: population size in year 0 
x10: population in year 0+10 
1980:482/482
1990: 0/482
2000: 0/482 
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Variable name definition missing values 
  independent variables MA-level   
Metropolitan population population size of metropolitan area 1980: 0/7
1990: 0/7
2000: 0/7 
French language region dummy variable: 
0: German and Italian speaking region 
1: French speaking region 
1980: 0/7
1990: 0/7
2000: 0/7 
Italian Language region dummy variable: 
0: German and French speaking region 
1: Italian speaking region 
1980: 0/7
1990: 0/7
2000: 0/7 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) number of communes per 10,000 inhabitants divided by the 
central city’s share of the overall metropolitan population in 
percent 
1980: 0/7
1990: 0/7
2000: 0/7 
Concentration (Herfindahl) index = Σpi2, 
where: 
p: metropolitan commune’s population share 
1980: 0/7
1990: 0/7
2000: 0/7 
Segregation (dissimilarity index) [ ]∑
=
−−=
n
i
ii PTPPptD
1
)1(2/  
where: 
ti: total population of areal unit i of n communes 
pi: minority proportion of areal unit i of n communes 
T: population size of the whole metropolitan area 
P: minority proportion of the whole metropolitan area 
1980: 0/7
1990: 0/7
2000: 0/7 
Polarisation (Nathan-Adams index Composite city-suburb hardship disparity index according 
to Nathan and Adams (1976, 1989), based on the following 
indicators: 
a) Low educational profile: proportion of residents aged 
above 14 with no or only compulsory schooling 
b) University degrees: proportion of residents holding an 
academic degree 
c) Dependents: proportion of population younger than 18 or 
older than 65 years 
d) Unemployment: proportion of population without a job 
and receiving a pension 
e) Cultural heterogeneity: proportion of school classes with 
more than 30% non-native speakers 
1980: 0/7
1990: 0/7
2000: 0/7 
Sources: 
- coordinates of the communes’ geographical centres: Institute for Transport Planning and Systems (ETH Zurich) 
- median income: Federal Tax Administration 
- all other data: Swiss Federal Statistical Office:  
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Appendix to 4.1 National electoral turnout 
Table 14 : National electoral turnout : homogenous subsets of communes (based on 
ANOVA) 
MA 1980 1990 2000 
Zurich  X X    X X    X    
Urban concentration x      x     x    
Poor suburbs x     x     x     
Middle class suburbs x       x    x    
Affluent suburbs  x       x    x   
Low density suburbs  x      x    x    
Basle  X    X X X    X    
Urban concentration x     x      x    
Poor suburbs  x    x     x     
Middle class suburbs  x    x     x x    
Affluent suburbs  x     x     x    
Low density suburbs  x    x     x     
Geneva X X    X X    X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x x    x x    
Middle class suburbs x      x x    x x   
Affluent suburbs x       x     x   
Low density suburbs x     x     x     
Berne   X X    X    X    
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x    x     x     
Middle class suburbs  x    x     x x    
Affluent suburbs  x     x     x    
Low density suburbs  x    x     x     
Lausanne X     X     X     
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x     x     
Middle class suburbs x     x     x     
Affluent suburbs x x    x     x     
Low density suburbs  x    x     x     
Lucerne    X  X X     X X   
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs  x    x     x     
Middle class suburbs   x   x     x     
Affluent suburbs  x x   x     x     
Low density suburbs   x   x     x     
Lugano    X     X    X   
Urban concentration x     x     x     
Poor suburbs x     x      x    
Middle class suburbs x     x      x    
Affluent suburbs x     x      x    
Low density suburbs      x          
Homogenous groups according to Scheffe’s post hoc test; significance=0.05 
 
